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Abstract 
 
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of an under-explored 
consequence of granting autonomy to workers: monitoring. In the principal-agent model 
that we develop, granting autonomy allows workers to carry out innovative tasks in the 
workplace. Given that innovative tasks are more difficult to monitor, the model predicts 
a positive relationship between autonomy and monitoring. Relying on information about 
blue-collar workers coming from a dataset of Spanish industrial plants, we provide strong 
support for this prediction.                
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1. Introduction 
 
Aghion and Tirole (1997) set out the theoretical foundations of a growing body of 
economic literature on authority in organizations. A worker’s real authority, or autonomy, 
is understood as being the capability of the worker to decide on the task to be performed. 
The bulk of this literature (see Bolton and Dewatripont 2012 for a summary) focuses on 
the effects of autonomy on workers’ efforts to collect information in order to be able to 
select the task to be performed. The present paper contributes to this literature by stressing 
another effect of granting autonomy: its consequences on the effort that workers exert on 
the execution of the task that is finally implemented. More specifically, we are interested 
in the relationship between autonomy and two mechanisms of the job design needed to 
elicit this productive effort: monitoring and compensation. When we talk of monitoring, 
we refer to efforts made by the firm (e.g. supervisors’ performance appraisal) to gather 
information about the way workers carry out productive tasks (inputs and/or outputs)1 . 
Several case studies, such as those by Nordstrom or Whole Foods Market or the bulk 
of those presented by Kaplan and Norton (2001), show a clear interaction between 
autonomy, monitoring and compensation. Nordstrom is a very successful firm in the 
apparel industry that gives sales clerks a lot of discretion in the way they carry out their 
work. Sarcastically, they call “the employee handbook” to a single five-by-eight-inch 
card, where the only rule states: “…use your good judgment in all situations. There will 
be no additional rules” (Collins and Porras 1994, p. 117). This sound philosophy is 
reinforced by the point of view expressed by the CEO Jim Nordstrom: “You can do 
anything you need to at Nordstrom, just so long as you live up to our basic values or 
                                                 
1
 It has been argued that autonomy and monitoring are antonymous terms (Neal 1993), related to the 
workers’ degree of empowerment to make a certain decision. Note that we use the term autonomy to refer 
to the degree of empowerment for the selection of the task to be performed, while we use the term 
monitoring to refer to the degree of empowerment for the execution of the task. 
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standards” (Collins and Porras 1994, p. 138). At the same time, they use sales per hour 
for monitoring purposes, calling it2 “the heart of Nordstrom’s distinctive management 
strategy”. This information influences pay, the availability of better hours and days and 
career opportunities.  
In the supermarket chain Whole Foods Market, “Small, empowered work groups are 
responsible for all key operating decisions, including pricing, ordering, staffing, and in-
store promotion. While associates are highly empowered, they are also highly 
accountable. Every four weeks, Whole Foods Market calculates the profit per labor hour 
for every team in every store. Teams that exceed a certain threshold get a bonus in their 
next paycheck…” (Hamel and Breen 2009, p.5) 
Thus, it is not surprising that the managerial and accounting literature suggests that 
the innovations resulting from workers’ empowerment will imply changes in the 
monitoring and compensation systems. The following statement underscores this idea.     
 
“(Employees) may innovate and find new and unexpected ways to 
achieve high-level strategic objectives or identify variations in the 
strategy that open up new growth opportunities.”(p.315)”Companies 
have been attempting to implement change for decades. Why do we 
advocate that change initiatives now be accompanied by a change in the 
measurement system to the Balanced Scorecard? Adapting the 
organization’s measurement system to the change agenda is critical for 
success.(p.343) “The final linkage from high-level strategy to day-to-
day actions occurs when companies link individuals’ incentive and 
reward programs to the Balanced Scorecard” (p.253). 
 
R.S. Kaplan and D.P. Norton, 2001, The Strategy-Focused Organization 
 
This anecdotal literature does not address the questions of why and how such 
decisions are interrelated. The way in which these variables of the job design interact is 
not straightforward. It might be plausible to consider different combinations. For 
                                                 
2
 See p. 7 of the case study: Nordstrom: Dissension in the Ranks (A), Harvard Business School  (9-191-
002), 1999.  
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example, are monitoring and compensation going to be higher (or lower) in contexts in 
which workers are empowered? Are firms going to provide less autonomy when 
monitoring costs and compensation levels are higher (lower)?  
This paper sets up a principal-agent model that provides insights into these questions. 
The firm (principal) decides whether to grant workers (agents) rights that allow then to 
make decisions on selecting the task needed to perform their job, and establish the 
monitoring and compensation levels that are contingent on this decision. The worker 
decides whether or not to implement a new task when this is possible, and the effort 
exerted in performing such a task.   
The main contribution of the model is to emphasise the effects of autonomy on the 
monitoring and compensation levels. Our explanation is based on the assumption that the 
firm has a comparative advantage in monitoring a customary task vis-à-vis an innovative 
task, i.e. the same quality of information can be obtained in the first case at a lower 
monitoring cost. The anecdotal literature cited above suggests that the nature of the task, 
whether customary or innovative, may determine different monitoring and compensation 
arrangements. Examples of monitoring arrangements are the ones suggested by the 
managerial accounting literature and associated with the implementation of monitoring 
systems, such as budgeting control, activity-based costs or the balanced scorecard. Some 
monitoring effort will entail sunk costs, for example training supervisors to understand 
the information to be gathered and the procedures established for gathering it. The 
comparative advantage in monitoring the customary task may come, for example, from 
not incurring such sunk costs again.  
 The remaining assumptions are in common use in the literature on authority in 
organizations (Bolton and Dewatripont 2012) or the provision of incentives in firms (for 
a summary see Prendergast 1999). Authority is usually linked to the assumption that both 
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firms and workers have private benefits related to different tasks. We depart from most 
of this literature by assuming that only firms obtain positive private benefits when an 
innovative task is implemented. Following Prendergast (2002), we assume that workers 
acquire private information on the best way to carry out the job when a firm places them 
in their jobs. This information cannot be communicated to management without cost. 
Therefore only the workers can decide if an innovation is introduced or not.  
In addition to the differences in monitoring tasks, our model differs from Prendergast 
(2002) in that the firms’ benefits are private, and workers do not obtain private benefits 
from selecting a given task. These last assumptions are made for the sake of expositional 
simplicity, not based on their realism. The assumptions avoid any other conflict of 
interests other than the one that the paper wishes to highlight. Autonomy allows the 
worker to introduce innovations whenever it is possible. When the increase in monitoring 
costs and wages does not compensate for the associated private benefits, the firm 
centralises decisions. 
The model also relies on several assumptions made in the literature on the provision 
of incentives in firms for linking monitoring and compensation. Specifically, models 
usually assume that in order to elicit effort from workers, firms must link their 
compensation to the (imperfect) information provided by the monitoring system about 
the effort exerted. We have designed the optimal monitoring system relying on Demougin 
and Fluet (1998, 2001). These authors show that in order to obtain a certain level of 
worker’s effort in a context of moral hazard, risk neutrality and limited liability, the 
features of the monitoring system can be summarised into just one parameter: the quality 
of information. We have borrowed this result in order to make our model more 
manageable. 
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 The main prediction of the model is that monitoring will be higher in those firms that 
provide autonomy. Typically, the information needed to test this hypothesis, i.e. the 
measures for monitoring and autonomy in the same dataset, is not available3. A distinctive 
characteristic of our data is that it specifically measures those variables. We rely on a 
database of Spanish industrial plants providing information about work organization 
practices for blue-collar workers. The data strongly supports the relationship predicted by 
the model. The model also suggests that in firms that pay above the market, higher levels 
of monitoring imply less rent to their workers. This prediction also receives strong 
support.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we develop the 
model and state its empirical implications. In Section 3, we present the empirical strategy, 
the data and the results of the estimations.  In Section 4, we conclude with the theoretical 
and empirical implications of the paper.  
 
2. The model 
 
2.1.  Model structure and main assumptions 
 
We use a principal-agent model with moral hazard, which considers a risk neutral 
firm and a risk neutral worker protected by limited liability. In what follows, our efforts 
will focus on setting out the job design within the contingent contract that the firm offers 
to the worker at the beginning of the contractual relationship. The model assumes that the 
optimal contract has to take into account the interactions between autonomy, monitoring 
                                                 
3For instance, we have not found such information in surveys such as the European Company Survey 2008 
of the European Foundation, the 5th European Survey on Working Conditions (2010) or the Workplace 
Employment Relations Study 2011 
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and compensation. Figure 1 shows the states of nature realized and the different decisions 
made from the offering of the contract until its execution. 
 
--Figure 1-- 
 
Stage 0. For the sake of simplicity, we summarize the possible ways in which a job can 
be performed, reducing them to just two tasks, the customary task, denoted by d = 0, and 
the innovative task, denoted by d =1. In this stage, it is common knowledge that there is a 
certain positive probability, λ > 0, that an innovative task will be feasible when the worker 
is appointed to the workplace. Given its experience, the firm could have an insight into the 
potential a given worker might have to introduce an innovation. In addition, the worker 
could have a good idea of their abilities and therefore an insight into their potential to 
introduce an innovation. We assume that the introduction of an innovation (d = 1) implies 
a reduction in production costs4 of B. This cost reduction is observable by the worker and 
the firm but not by third parties, consequently, we assume that it is non-contractible. 
Stage 1.The firm offers a contract after λ and B are known. Following Demougin and 
Fluet (1998, 2001), we assume that the firm is risk neutral and its problem is to design a 
contract that minimizes the expected costs for ensuring that the worker executes a task 
with a certain level of effort eˆ . The contract is designed in order to be accepted by the 
agent. The firm offers a contingent contract with different levels of autonomy, monitoring 
and wages. We assume that the worker is risk neutral but protected by limited liability5. 
The maximum fine that she can receive is F ≥0. This can also be interpreted in terms of 
                                                 
4In a seminal book, Landau and Rosemberg (1986) offer a series of contexts in which the introduction of 
innovations result in cost reduction.  
5Limited liability is a common justification for the use of efficiency wages or the existence of rents as 
incentive devices (see, for example the extensive literature presented by Saint-Paul 1996). 
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the agent’s ability to post a bond as it is done in the agency model (Holmström 1979). 
Additionally, the reservation utility for the employee is zero.  
Hence, the worker’s expected utility is defined as the expected wage )(wE minus the 
cost of the effort to execute the task, represented by function ( )C e , which is defined ∀ ∈
0, ̅, so the domain is a closed interval of efforts with the lowest value of 0 and the 
highest value of ̅ , where ̂ < ̅ . The cost of effort function has the usual regular 
properties, (0) 0C = , 0)(' >eC , 0)('' >eC , ( )C e = ∞ and '(0) 0C = . We restrict our 
analysis to bonus-based compensation contracts, where only two (high and low) possible 
wages will be considered. Under the assumptions made, Kim (1997) shows that bonus-
based contracts can reproduce all the first-best possible solutions obtained with other 
contractual forms, for example linear incentive contracts (Holmstrom 1979). Finally, the 
worker can always leave the firm at any of the following stages. 
 
Stage 2: If the worker accepts the contract, she is placed in the job and observes 
whether the innovative task can be introduced. As commented before, the existence of a 
positive probability that the worker may implement an innovation is common knowledge, 
nevertheless, in this stage this state of nature is performed and observed exclusively by the 
worker. The availability of an innovation once the worker has taken up the job is private 
information. With this information, the worker decides whether to innovate (d = 1) or not 
(d = 0). When the innovative task is not available, there is no choice, (d = 0). The 
introduction of an innovative task is observable and contractible. 
There is a certain amount of literature assuming non-verifiability of innovations (see 
for example Aghion and Tirole 1997). This is not a critical point in our model. The results 
would be maintained if innovations were non-verifiable but produced changes in the 
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monitoring systems that can be observed. The critical point in our model is that changes 
in the monitoring systems are verifiable and contractible. 
The worker’s private information is about the actual feasibility of the innovation. 
Therefore the contract - which is offered in Stage 1- cannot stipulate something like “if an 
innovation is feasible it must be adopted”. However, the contract can forbid innovations6, 
for example by dismissing the worker if an innovation is introduced. In that case, the 
worker will not receive any compensation and the firm will not incur monitoring costs. 
Since it is never in the interest of the worker to introduce an innovation when it is 
forbidden, this case does not deserve further attention. We therefore consider two 
situations: centralization with no innovations, and autonomy where innovations can be 
introduced. Whether the firm provides autonomy (a = 1) or centralizes (a = 0) is something 
that has to be specified in the contract. The decision about the provision of autonomy 
determines a set of monitoring/compensation combinations from among which the worker 
can select. 
Note that instead of granting decision rights to the worker, we could model this 
interaction as a game of communication (Dessein 2002). When the worker observes the 
state of nature in Stage 2, “if an innovation is feasible” she sends a message recommending 
the innovative task, and in a truth-telling equilibrium, the firm orders the worker to 
undertake the recommended task. These two scenarios are plausible. We may assume 
costly communication, errors and credibility/commitment issues to favour our 
interpretation, using autonomy to implement the right task instead of the truthful revelation 
game.  
Stage 3. The principal invests in monitoring the task with intensity m. Firms can invest 
in monitoring mechanisms (e.g. absenteeism control systems or productivity 
                                                 
6Beside benefits, innovations also imply costs.  
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measurements) to collect public and contractible information about the effort exerted by 
the worker in performing the task. In the case of bonus-based contracts, Demougin and 
Fluet (1998) show that it is optimal for the firm to summarize all the information available 
about the worker’s performance (input, output or both) in a binary statistic I= { },H L . 
This binary information system is imperfectly correlated to the effort level, so there is 
a positive probability of obtaining signal H for a certain level of effort e, monitoring 
intensity m and the task selected d, which is represented by the probability function7 
),,/( dmeHP . Let us assume that the probability function is twice-continuously 
differentiable with respect to e, 0'>P , so H can be interpreted as favourable information 
about the worker’s effort, and 0"<P . 
 
Demougin and Fluet (1998, 2001) show that, for higher values of = ̂´( ̂,⁄ ,)
( ̂⁄ ,,)
 , it is 
possible to implement the level of effort eˆ with lower (or at least the same) expected 
wages. Therefore, for the firm’s purposes, the features of a monitoring system for a 
concrete task can be summarized by θ, which is interpreted as a measurement of the quality 
(or precision) of the information provided by the monitoring system (θ∈[0,1]). 
 
We depart from Demougin and Fluet by assuming that the quality of the information 
about the worker’s performance will depend on the introduction of innovations (d) and on 
the monitoring intensity (m) in the following way: θ(d) ≡ γ(1- d) + m. In other words, given 
the level of effort eˆ , the probability of obtaining signal H only depends on the quality of 
the information ))(/( dHP θ . 
                                                 
7
 One function with all the properties described below is θγ eedmeHP md == +− )1(),,/( , defined ∀ ∈
0, ̅ = 1. 
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We assume that θ(d) is public information. The parameter γ is positive and reflects the 
cost advantage for the firm of monitoring the customary task vis-à-vis the innovative task. 
The additive functional form of θ implies that the informational advantage γ is independent 
of the level of monitoring intensity. Another assumption is made simply to simplify and 
eliminate the trivial solution that there is no need to invest in monitoring the customary 
task: the informational advantage of the customary task (d = 0) to elicit effort ê  is positive 
but sufficiently small:
FeC
eCe
+
<< )ˆ(
)ˆ('ˆ0 γ . 
Let us define M as the minimum level of investment needed to obtain monitoring 
intensity m. Both variables m and M are contractible and relate to each other according to 
the following function: M =M(m). The function (.)M  satisfies the usual properties,
 
,0)0( =M is twice differentiable and continuously increasing in m, 0(.)' >M , 0(.)" >M  
and ∞→− )1( γM  . 
Stage 4. After the task is chosen (together with the associated monitoring intensity), 
the worker exerts productive effort e in performing such a task. As in standard agency 
models (Holmström 1979, Shavel 1979), there is asymmetric information about the level 
of this variable. Thus, in order to elicit the optimal level of effort, the compensation of the 
worker will be based on statistic I= { },H L , where Hw  is the wage paid when a high level 
of performance has been observed and Lw  the wage paid when a low level of performance 
has been observed. 
 
2.2. The firm’s cost minimization problem 
 
In this section we set out the firm’s problem formally. The firm has to design the 
contract taking into account the fact that the worker has discretion in selecting the job 
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task (verifiable and contractible) and the level of unverifiable effort. The first decision to 
be made is about the provision of autonomy. The level of monitoring and wages will 
depend on the fact that an innovation has been introduced (d = 1) or not (d = 0). This fact 
is reflected by the following notation: m(d), Hw (d) and Lw (d). 
We then define the expected costs (TC(d)) of inducing a level of effort eˆ of a certain 
task (d) as the sum of the expected wages and monitoring costs: 
 
TC(d) ≡  E(w(d)) + M(m(d)) = ))(/( dHP θ ( Hw (d) - Lw (d)) + Lw (d)  + M(m(d)) 
 
The firm solves the minimization of the cost function O: 
 
)0()1())0()1())1(((
)(),(),(,
TCaTCBTCaOMin
dwdwdma LH
−+−+−= λλ
 
s.t. 
))())((min(argˆ eCdwEe −= 1,0=∀d       (1) 
[ ] [ ][ ] [ ] 1,00)ˆ()0()1()0()1()1( =∀≥−−+−+ aeCwEawEwEa λλ   (2) 
( )[ ] ( ) 1,0,0 =∀≥− dêCdwE        (3) 
1,00)(0)( =∀≥+≥+ dFdwandFdw LH      (4) 
))0(())1(( wEwE ≥
        (5) 
 
Restrictions (1) and (2) are the standard incentive compatibility and participation 
constraints. Restriction (3) is the interim participation constraint which guarantees that it 
is in the best interest of the worker to continue in the firm after the private information is 
revealed but before exerting effort. Restriction (4) is the limited liability constraint. 
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Restriction (5) guarantees that it is in the best interest of the worker to introduce an 
innovation whenever possible. Remember also thatθ(d) ≡γ(1- d) + m . 
 
2.3. Solution of the model  
 
The objective function of the firm can be rewritten as: 
 
)0()()0())0()1(( TCBaTCBTCTCaO +−∆=+−−= λλ  
 
Where ∆= TC(1) - TC(0) is the firm’s cost difference between introducing or not 
introducing an innovation. Note that whenever B-∆> 0, autonomy will be provided (a= 1 
minimizes the objective function). Whatever the decision of the worker regarding the 
introduction of innovations, d=0 or d=1, the minimization of the objective function 
implies minimizing the cost function TC(d) subject to Restrictions 1 to 4. Next, a 
proposition summarises the results, and Appendix 1 provides the proofs. 
 
Proposition 1: An optimal contract to implement a level of effort eˆ is determined by 
the following conditions: 
 
a) The optimal information level about performance is: 
    }),({)(* NRR dMind θθθ = , where )}1()(()(
)ˆ('ˆ
min{arg)( ddM
d
eCedR −−+∈ γθθ
θ  
   NRθ =
( ) '
( )
ê C ê
C ê F+
, where m*(d) ≡θ * (d) - γ(1- d) > 0 and γ ≥ m*(1) - m*(0) >0. 
 
b) The optimal wages contingent on the monitoring signal I = {H,L} are: 
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Lw *(d) = -F 
     
Hw *(d) = )ˆ(*'/)ˆ(' ePeC  - F 
 
Where, ))(*/()ˆ(* dHPeP θ= . When *( ) NRdθ θ= , the worker does not obtain rents. 
The expected wages 
NR
eCe
θ
)ˆ('ˆ
 will be equal to the costs of effort. In the other case, 
   )()(* dd Rθθ = , the worker obtains rents, )(
)ˆ('ˆ
d
eCe
Rθ
≥ )ˆ(eC . 
 
c) The optimal level of autonomy is: 
 
*
*
1                   if  0
0                   otherwise.
B
a

− ∆ ≥

= 


 
 
      Where ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )0   0 /  - 1   1 /   0 - 1 ******* mMmMTCTC ++==∆ θαθα
 
and α 
ˆ ˆ'( )eC e≡ .   
   
The contract establishes the consequences of all possible contingencies at the outset. 
In this sense, first autonomy is either provided to the worker, or not, based on the firm’s 
and the worker’s features. After autonomy has been provided, the state of nature regarding 
the feasibility of the innovation is revealed. Should the innovation prove feasible, and the 
worker has autonomy, it is always in her interest to introduce an innovation. The 
monitoring levels in the contract will be contingent to the fact that autonomy has been 
provided and the innovation is feasible. The firms will establish compensations based on 
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the signal, whether low or high, that is finally generated about the worker’s effort. 
Compensation differences between one case and another will be contingent to the 
provision of autonomy, the feasibility of the innovation and monitoring levels. In 
equilibrium the contract can display four different outcomes, no rent with no autonomy, 
no rent with autonomy, rent with no autonomy and rent with autonomy. 
 
2.4. Empirical implications 
 
In actual fact, the contract can be understood as a way of reproducing the series of 
decisions that will be made by the worker and the firm according to their expectations 
about the future at any particular stage. In the empirical applications, we will observe the 
decisions that are finally made and not a written contract about the level of autonomy (ai), 
monitoring (mi) and rents (ri) established by the firm i. This rationale justifies the joint 
analysis of these key variables of the organization’s design.  
Furthermore, in accordance with the model, these decisions are made in the following 
sequence. First, autonomy is provided (or not), then the firm invests in monitoring, and 
finally the compensation system is established. Although not modelled, shocks will 
presumably appear between these decisions. These shocks affect future decisions, but 
previous decisions cannot be reverted. 
Consequently, monitoring ( im ) will be established on the basis of previously realized 
variables, such as autonomy ( ia ) and other observed (xji a set of J control variables; j = 1 
,…J described in the next section) or unobserved variables (random variables im,ε ). 
Therefore, the following equation can be estimated for a sample of firms: 
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imjij
J
j
ii xam ,
1
εψη ++= Σ
=
        (6), 
 
where the η and ψ’s
  
are the parameters to be estimated.  
Furthermore, at the time compensation ( ir ) is determined, autonomy and monitoring 
have already been implemented. The structure of the theoretical model thus suggests the 
estimation of a recursive system of equations configured by (6) and the following 
equation: 
 
irjij
J
j
iii xmar ,
1
21 εξββ +++= Σ
=
        (7), 
 
where β ’s and ξ’’s are parameters to be estimated. Note that, in Equation (7), the variable 
monitoring is endogenous (E( ir ,ε / im )=g( im )≠0) whenever the correlation of the error 
terms of the equations ρ  is not null. Previous literature analyzing the relationship 
between rents and monitoring (reviewed in the next section) did not take into account that 
autonomy (the selection of the task to be executed) will affect monitoring (the investment 
to monitor how much effort has been exerted in the execution of the task) and, based on 
that, compensation will be established. Most of the variables affecting one decision will 
thus affect the subsequent ones. 
 
Sources of firm’s heterogeneity are needed in order to formulate predictions about the 
parameters to be estimated. To focus the discussion, we are going to assume that firms 
differ only in terms of two types of shocks (the rest of the exogenous variables in the 
model are the same for all the firms). One type of shock affects the private benefits B and 
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occurs just before the autonomy decision has to be made. This shock introduces 
differences in private benefits across firms. A second shock affects the monitoring cost 
functions of firms and may occur after autonomy has been granted but before the 
monitoring is implemented. This shock introduces differences in the marginal costs of 
monitoring among firms and autonomy (or centralization) cannot be reverted after the 
shock is produced 8 . In Appendix 2 we extend this assumption more formally and 
incorporate it into the model. For the sake of simplicity, we present the simplified version 
of this model in the text. 
The first kind of shock, changes in B, only has consequences in Proposition 1c, 
implying that different firms provide different levels of autonomy. For those firms not 
providing autonomy (B< ∆*), according to Proposition 1a, the monitoring level (m* (0)) 
will never be higher than the level implemented by those firms providing autonomy.  A 
percentage (1-λ) of the firms that have provided autonomy (B ≥∆*) will not introduce 
innovations (d=0), so they will have the same levels of monitoring (m* (0)). The 
remaining (λ) percentage of cases will introduce innovations (d=1), and therefore have 
higher levels of monitoring, m*(1) - m*(0) >0. If we cannot control for the fact that an 
innovation has been introduced in the workplace, then the expected monitoring level in 
firms that provide autonomy (λ ( m* (1) - m* (0)) +m* (0)) will be higher than in firms 
without autonomy, m* (0). The model then predicts that the higher the autonomy for 
selecting the task developed, the higher the investment devoted to monitoring the 
execution of this task. The following hypothesis summarizes this relationship. 
 
                                                 
8
 A complete contract could be written contingent on this shock, but the task has to be selected before the 
shock and it is extremely costly to change the task after the shock.  
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Hypothesis 1: The level of monitoring will be higher in those firms that have provided 
autonomy ( 0>η ). 
 
 Observe that monitoring refers to the level of investment in monitoring, and not 
to the output of such investments: the quality of information. The cost-disadvantage of 
monitoring new tasks implies that the quality of the information finally obtained by those 
firms that delegate decision-making will not be superior to that obtained by other firms 
(from Proposition 1a: θ *(1) - θ *(0)= m*(1) - m*(0) - γ ≤ 0), even if they invest more in 
monitoring.  
Note that the differences in monitoring will always be higher than the differences in 
the quality of information (m*(1) - m*(0) – (θ *(0) - θ *(1)) =  γ > 0). Indeed, there will 
only be differences in the quality of information when workers obtain rents when an 
innovation is introduced (Propositions 1a and 1b). In these cases, an inferior quality of 
information and higher expected rents and monitoring levels is predicted than in those 
firms that continue with the customary tasks. Therefore, in these particular cases (in which 
workers obtain rents when innovation tasks are selected), the shocks in private profits 
also imply a positive correlation between rents and monitoring. As monitoring is also 
positively correlated to autonomy, it also implies a positive correlation between rents and 
autonomy.  
 
These relationships, however, are not clear once additional shocks in monitoring costs 
arise after a task has been chosen. We are now in a context similar to Demougin and Fluet 
(2001). Such costs imply that firms, even those with the same level of autonomy, will 
have different monitoring levels. From Proposition 1b we expect that, having selected a 
task (d), in firms with lower levels of monitoring (
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( ) ( ) )1()1()( ddmdddm NRNRRR −+=≤−+= γθγθ ) workers will obtain rents (and these 
rents will decrease with monitoring levels) whereas, when the monitoring levels are 
sufficiently high ( ( ) ( )dmdm NRR > ), workers will not obtain rents. The hypothesis below 
summarizes the preceding discussion, assuming that the monitoring shocks are the 
predominant source to explain the relationship between rents and the remaining variables.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Workers’ rent will be higher in those firms that have lower levels of 
monitoring ( 02 <β ). 
 
Take note that, if there are only the two shocks described above, the differences in 
workers’ rents across firms are completely explained by differences in monitoring 
investment. Therefore, after controlling for monitoring, we will not expect any 
relationship between rents and autonomy ( 01 =β ). This is trivial in contracts displaying 
no worker’s rents in equilibrium. When rents exist, their variations are driven by shocks 
in the monitoring costs. 
 We do not have clear predictions for the correlation between the error terms ( ρ ) of 
the equations above. One could argue that a shock increasing the monitoring investment 
also increases the probability of obtaining a good signal and receiving high compensation. 
As the observed rents ( Hw  or Lw ) will be different to the expected rents in the model, one 
could suggest a positive correlation between the error terms of the equations above. 
 
2.5. Related evidence and control variables 
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The evidence from the empirical analysis of the determinants of wages is 
overwhelming. The literature provides several examples of efforts attempting to provide 
empirical evidence of the negative relationship between compensation and monitoring9, 
which has typically been interpreted as evidence of the efficiency wage model (Shapiro 
and Stiglitz 1984).  
Using this theoretical benchmark, Gordon (1994) and Georgiadis (2013) analyse the 
determinants of monitoring, of which there is much less extensive evidence (Neal 1993, 
Osterman 1994). Furthermore, some studies have interpreted monitoring as being the 
opposite concept to autonomy (Neal 1993), and thus the relationship between monitoring 
and autonomy remains unexplored. 
The model developed helps to clarify these concepts. In the model, autonomy refers 
to the decision of selecting a task, and monitoring to the supervision of the task execution. 
The model makes predictions about the expected relationship between them. Furthermore, 
the theoretical benchmark developed suggests the need for a simultaneous empirical 
analysis of the determinants of workers’ monitoring and compensation in order to control 
for omitted variables that could affect both decisions at the same time. As far as we know, 
this simultaneous analysis is restricted to Georgiadis (2013), who uses it to analyse the 
introduction of the national minimum wage legislation on wages and supervision, and 
where autonomy does not play any role.  
In order to provide this analysis we are going to control for variables related to the 
characteristics of the workforce and the job place, labor relations and company 
environment. The cited empirical literature has emphasized that those variables could be 
related to workers’ monitoring and compensation levels. It is far from our purposes to 
provide a complete description of the variables used previously. The justification of 
                                                 
9
   Leonard (1987), Groshen and Krueger (1989), Neal (1993), Rebitzer (1995), Arai (2003), Ewing and 
Wunnava (2004). 
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control variables set out below focuses on those variables on which we have collected 
information. 
With regard to the workforce, we have collected information on the way it fits in 
with the job and the organization (Sekiguchi 2004). To proxy the concept of person-job 
fit, the literature has used variables such as skill requirements (Adams 2002), educational 
level (Neal 1993, Nagar 2002), experience (Neal 1993) or training (Rebitzer 1995). On 
the other hand, following the personnel psychology literature, the concept of person-
organization fit can be proxied by the soft skill requirements (Schneider et al. 1995, 
Kristof 1996). The literature suggests a negative association between the fitting levels and 
monitoring, in fact there is evidence of this relationship between levels of skills 
(Osterman 1994), experience and education (Neal 1993) and monitoring. Furthermore, 
earlier scholarly works suggests a positive association between the level of skills (Earle 
2009), schooling (Arai 2003), experience (Altonji and Shatokvo 1987, Arai 2003) and 
training (Rebitzer 1995) and the level of wages paid to the workers.  
With regard to the workplace, we collected information on the complexity of the 
job position, the size of the plant, whether the firm is a single-plant or multi-plant, and 
the plant’s technological intensity. Job complexity is a variable that has attracted the 
attention of scholars in the last few years as a determinant of the organizational design 
(Ben-Ner at al. 2012). The inclusion of variables related to the size of the firm or business 
unit is standard in the literature because of their effects on all organizational design 
choices (Nagar 2002). Overall, the literature provides evidence of a negative correlation 
between size and monitoring (Osterman 1994, Ewing and Wunnava 2004). On the other 
hand, most empirical studies provide evidence of a positive association between the size 
of the firm and the level of wages (Brown and Medoff 1985, Rebitzer 1995, Arai 2003, 
Ewing and Wunnava 2004).  We also control for the existence of additional plants 
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belonging to the same headquarters because the decisions related to organizational design 
might be made by them instead of by the plant managers (Foss and Laursen 2005). Lastly, 
controlling for industry is also a common practice in the literature (DeVaro and Kurtulus 
2010, Ben-Ner et al. 2012) because each industry type has particular characteristics in 
terms of technology or capital intensity (Foss and Laursen 2005), with possible effects on 
the variables in the organizations design.  
In reference to labor relations, we collected information about the presence of 
unions, collective bargaining agreements and job stability policies. Similar variables have 
been considered in many studies dealing with wages10 and the intensity of monitoring 
(Neal, 1993 and Gordon, 1994). In most cases this literature provides mixed results. There 
seems to be only a certain consensus on a negative correlation between the degree to 
which firms monitor workers and job stability (Gordon 1994, Osterman 1994, Neal 1993).  
Regarding the environment in which firms operate, we obtained information about 
the degree of market competition and the uncertainty of the environment. The empirical 
literature provides evidence of a negative association between the level of wages and 
competition in the product market (Dickens and Katz 1987, Krueger and Summers 1987, 
Nickell, Vainomiaki and Wadhwani 1993). There has been a huge debate with mixed 
evidence on the role of uncertainty on wages (see Prendergrast, 2002). Recent research 
(Ben-Ner et al. 2012) has postulated that uncertainty has effects on other variables of the 
organizational design. We therefore consider that this could also be the case for 
monitoring.    
      
 
3. Empirical approach 
 
                                                 
10
 Groshen and Krueger (1990), Osterman (1994), Altonji and Williams (1997), Arai (2003).   
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3.1. Data 
 
The data for testing the hypotheses is taken from a survey11  designed to obtain 
information on the human resources and work organization practices of Spanish industrial 
establishments. The original questionnaire was fine-tuned with a pre-test sample of 15 
plant directors. The use of subjective assessments by the interviewee on various scales is 
a common practice in the empirical literature concerned with the analysis of human 
resources and work organization practices. This approach allows for the possibility of 
obtaining information on certain concepts even if objective information is not available.  
The target group was a collection of manufacturing establishments in mainland12 
Spain with 50 or more workers and whose economic activity was included in one of the 
13 manufacturer sectors of the NACE classification for 1993.13 The unit of observation 
is the establishment, not the firm as a whole. The sample of firms or manufacturing plants 
was identified in CAMERDATA (the database for the chamber of commerce of Spain) 
and consisted of 3,000 plants. A stratified random sample, guaranteeing stratums by size 
and industrial sector, based on 402 interviews (13.5% of the target group) was finally 
achieved. A questionnaire form was filled in for each establishment between December 
2007 and April 2008, using personal interviews approximately 60 minutes long carried 
out by a specialized firm, in most cases with the directors or with the production or human 
                                                 
11
 The survey was jointly designed by a group of researchers from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 
Universitat Illes Balears, Universidad Pública de Navarra, and Universidad de Zaragoza. The questionnaire 
can be provided on request. 
12
 Due to budget restrictions, the Canary and Balearic Islands as well as the two smallest (in terms of per 
capita GDP) Autonomous Communities, Castilla La Mancha and Extremadura, were excluded from the 
sample. 
13
 The European Community statistical classification of economic activities. 
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resources managers of the plant.14 Since some questionnaires were incomplete15 , we 
ended up with 358 observations. Table 1 compares the distribution of the plants by size 
and economic sector among the population of Spanish manufacturing establishments16 
and the sample. As we can see, overall the percentages or quotes for each category are 
very close, indicating no sampling selection bias problems, at least by the variables for 
which we can control. 
 
-Insert Table 1- 
 
3.2. Variables 
 
The first column of Table 2 shows the original questions from which we define the 
variables used in the estimations. As Neal (1993) suggests, monitoring can be interpreted 
as the opposite concept to autonomy. In the theoretical section two decisions have to be 
monitored and delegated, the selection and the effort in the execution of a task. We use 
the word autonomy when we refer to the selection of the task and the word monitoring 
when we refer to the execution of the task. The definition of the variables from the 
questionnaire suggests that this is also the sense of the questions used to measure these 
two variables. Furthermore, monitoring refers to the efforts made by the firm to monitor 
its workers (respondents assess whether on performing their job, workers are extensively 
supervised) and not to the results of such efforts or information quality. With the 
                                                 
14Interviewer status was required by the questionnaire. Specifically, there are 9 possibilities: single owner 
(1% of the sample), partner or co-owner (3.4 % of the sample), chairperson (2% of the sample), director or 
general manager (13.8% of the sample), sole director of a limited liability company (11.6% of the sample), 
plant manager (9% of the sample), production manager (13.5% of the sample), human resources manager 
(17.8% of the sample) and others (32% of the sample). 
15
 The missing values are spread throughout the different variables of the sample.  
16
 The population data are taken from the Central Directorate of Companies (Directorio Central de 
Empresas--DIRCE) of the Spanish National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España-
-INE). 
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exception of a continuous variable, plant Size, and three binary answers, the industrial 
sector, the presence of Collective agreement and whether the firm has a Multi-plant 
structure, the variables have been constructed on the basis of the degree of agreement of 
the interviewed on certain assertions. The degree of agreement is measured using a Likert 
scale from 1 to 5. 
 
--Insert table 2 about here— 
 
The dependent variables in Equations 6 and 7, Monitoring and Rents, are originally 
measured as ordinal variables. For the case of Rents there are no answers for category 5, 
so we will consider just four categories. Further information about the distribution of 
these variables is provided in Table 3. The contingent distribution of these variables 
according to the level of autonomy provided by the firm suggests a positive relationship 
between autonomy and monitoring (Hypothesis 1) and a negative one between rents and 
autonomy.      
 
--Insert table 3 about here— 
 
 
 Working with ordinal variables when they are used as independent variables causes 
problems in empirical applications. The proper use of those variables as explanatory ones 
implies including four dummies related with each item in the estimations. A problem with 
this procedure is that some of the categories have very few observations, causing co-
linearity in the estimations. In order to avoid such problems, and for the sake of 
expositional simplicity, we proceed to construct one dummy for each ordinal variable. 
This requires the selection of a category cut-off. Some studies (e.g. Foss and Laursen 
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2005) have used the original medium category (value 3 in our case) for this purpose. The 
application of this procedure in our data provides highly skewed distributions for certain 
variables. We therefore followed an alternative procedure, which is some form of 
standardization: the cut-off will be the category closest to representing the median for the 
distribution of the variable. We thus proceeded to group the adjacent original categories 
with the aim of finally obtaining two categories with the most egalitarian distribution 
possible for the observations. Following this method, we create the binary variables: 
Autonomy, Union influence, Market competition, Job stability, Technological intensity 
and Soft skill requirements. 
A challenge is presented when more than 50 percent of the observations were 
concentrated in the original medium category (value 3). In those cases, we consider three 
categories (two dummy variables), but only if each resulting category comprises at least 
10 percent of the observations. This is the case for the variables Qualification 
requirements, Uncertainty and Training. 
The questionnaire contains 6 statements related to degree of complexity in the 
production process (see the definitions in Table 2). In particular, these statements refer to 
the number of products produced, to the modifications made to the products, and to 
product turnover, which presumably increase the number of activities performed by the 
worker and therefore resemble the concept of complexity considered by Prendergast 
(2002). We applied the principal component factor analysis to summarize this information. 
The application of this technique resulted in one factor with a Cronbach alpha of 0.75. 
This index will be considered in the analysis as our measure of Job complexity. By 
construction this variable has a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1. A summary of 
the variables defined in this section can be found in the last columns of Table 2.   
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3.3. Econometric models 
 
In accordance with the original questions, the variables Monitoring and Rents are 
ordinal with five and four categories, respectively. Therefore, the model to be estimated 
is as follows: 
 
imjij
J
j
ii xam ,
1
* εψη ++= Σ
=
        (6) 
irjij
J
j
iii xmar ,
1
21* εξββ +++= Σ
=
       (7) 
 
Where *im and 
*
ir are latent variables. If we assume that the error terms of both 
equations are uncorrelated ( ρ = 0), then we can estimate two independent order probit 
models (Model 1). Note, however, that the estimation of the effect of monitoring on rents 
--Equation (7)-- will suffer from endogeneity problems if the error terms are correlated (
ρ ≠ 0). As far as we know, this recursive model (e.g. a bivariate model) in which both 
dependent and independent variables are ordinal has not been previously estimated (see 
Greene 2012, p.833).   
 
The closest model already estimated is the semi-order bivariate probit model (Greene 
and Hensher 2009). To estimate this model, the variable Monitoring has to be transformed 
into a binary variable, which is included as the dependent variable in Equation (6) and as 
an independent variable in Equation (7). The estimator of the relationship between rents 
and monitoring that this methodology provides is a full information instrumental variable 
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(Hausman, 1975), in the sense that it takes into account the possible correlation between 
disturbances and regressors, and between the disturbances of the two equations. The semi-
order bivariate model (Model 2) also provides an estimation of the correlation between 
the error terms of both equations and allows us to perform an exogeneity test. If we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the error terms are uncorrelated, we cannot reject the 
assumption that monitoring is exogenous (Monfardini and Radice, 2008) and our 
preferred model would be Model 1 (otherwise it would be Model 2). 
 In the next section, we present the estimation of both models using robust standard 
errors. In Equation (7), Monitoring is always a dummy variable created using the same 
procedures applied for the rest of the independent variables. This is also the dependent 
variable in Equation (6) when we estimate Model 2, but in Model 1 we use it in an ordinal 
form. 
 
 
3.4. Results 
 
Table 4 shows the estimations of Models 1 and 2. At the 1 percent level, the likelihood 
ratio rejects the null hypothesis that all the explanatory variables are zero in both models. 
The correlation coefficient estimated in Model 2 is positive but not statistically 
significant, so the Wald test of independency between equations (6) and (7) cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the error terms are uncorrelated ( ρ = 0).  
Thus, we will focus first on the results obtained from the estimation of our preferred 
specification, Model 1. The estimation of Equation 6 provides strong support for 
Hypothesis 1. The coefficient of the variable Autonomy is positive and statistically 
different from zero at the 1 percent level. In this estimation, there are four additional 
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variables that play a role in determining the extent of workers’ monitoring. The variable 
Soft skill requirements has a positive and statistically significant effect (at 2 percent level) 
on Monitoring. Technological intensity, Collective agreements and Job stability have a 
negative and statistically significant effect (at 4, 3 and 4 percent levels, respectively) on 
Monitoring.  
The second column of Model 1 shows the results of the estimation of Rents, Equation 
(7). Hypothesis 2 also receives support. The coefficient of the variable Monitoring is 
negative and statistically significantly different from zero at the four percent level. From 
the remaining coefficients, there is an array of variables playing a role in determining the 
level of Rents. The coefficient of the variable Job complexity is negative and statistically 
significantly different from zero at the 9% level. The variables Medium training, High 
training, Multiplant, Unions influence and Collective agreements are positive and 
statistically significant at 7, 1, 7, 1 and 9 percent level, respectively. 
   
-Insert Table 4 about here- 
 
The main difference between the coefficients estimated in Models 1 and 2 is the 
magnitude of the effect of Monitoring on Rents. It seems that if there were endogeneity 
problems in the estimations of Model 1, we would be underestimating the negative effect 
of Monitoring on Rents in Equation (7), due to the positive correlation between the error 
terms of both equations (although not statistically significant).  
Furthermore, in Model 2 some of the variables that were statistically significant in 
Model 1 lose their significance. This is the case of Job complexity and Collective 
agreement in Equation (7) and Technological intensity in Equation (6).  
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We have estimated other models (not reported in the text), modifying the 
categorization of the dependent and independent variables, and the main conclusions 
regarding Hypotheses 1 and 2 are maintained. 
    
 
4. Conclusion and discussion 
 
This paper suggests that providing autonomy to the workforce implies higher 
investments in monitoring the new tasks that workers could introduce in the workplace 
as a consequence of their discretion. A theoretical model is developed for understanding 
the implications of this assumption for the way in which autonomy, monitoring and 
compensation policies of firms interact. The paper provides empirical evidence 
supporting the main predictions of the model.  
The theoretical model has important managerial implications for those firms that 
would like to provide autonomy to their workers in order to take advantage of their better 
knowledge of the workplace. Autonomy creates room for workers to introduce innovative 
tasks into the workplace. These innovative tasks require higher investments in the 
monitoring systems aimed at collecting information about the workers’ performance. In 
order to provide incentives to workers, firms must link wages to the information collected 
about their performance.  
In more formal terms, new tasks will imply higher monitoring levels in order to induce 
the same level of effort from workers as in customary tasks. Therefore, given this higher 
cost, it could be perfectly possible that some firms centralize decisions even if autonomy 
generates private profits to the firm. Once firms have decided on the level of autonomy 
to be provided, shocks in the monitoring costs could cause firms with the same levels of 
autonomy to provide different monitoring and rent combinations. Monitoring and rents 
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are substitutes in the production of effort, which implies a negative association between 
current levels of monitoring and rents.      
Some of these arguments have already been discussed individually in the theoretical 
literature. For example, Prendergrast (2002) suggests that firms can take advantage of the 
workers’ better information about the workplace by providing them with autonomy. 
Demougin and Fluet (1998, 2001) make an effort to understand the relationship between 
investment decisions on monitoring and the wage policy.  
Bolton and Dewatripont (2012) summarizes a body of literature analyzing autonomy 
as a mechanism for enhancing the effort to provide information to aid the taking of 
decisions. Our contribution is to introduce into the analysis of organizations the inter-
relationship between monitoring the execution of the task and autonomy for selecting the 
task to be executed. This connection allows us to analyze the way in which three key 
variables of the job design, autonomy, monitoring and compensation, are related. To the 
best of our knowledge, this modelling has not been done before.  
The model is inspired by the anecdotal evidence about the relationship between the 
variables of the job design analyzed here. It generates several empirical implications. If 
firms behave according to the model, they will decide the level of autonomy by taking 
into account the predictions of the future levels of monitoring and wages. However, the 
final level of monitoring will be contingent to the level of autonomy granted and the 
random shocks that might affect monitoring costs. As far as we are aware, there is no 
empirical analysis of this relationship. In a similar way, wages are established based on 
optimal monitoring levels. The theoretical model suggests that exogenous variables will 
affect monitoring and rents at the same time; therefore, it is important to test the presence 
of endogeneity problems affecting the estimation of the impact of monitoring on rents.  
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To test the empirical implications of the model, we use a sample of 358 Spanish 
industrial plants. The results confirm the main hypotheses of the model, monitoring is 
positively related to autonomy and rents are negatively related to monitoring. 
Furthermore, there is no relation between autonomy and rents in the estimations reported 
in the paper. Although there is extensive evidence on the negative relationship between 
monitoring and rents (Leonard 1987, Groshen and Krueger 1989, Neal 1993, Rebitzer 
1995), Arai (2003), Ewing and Wunnava (2004), Gordon 1994, Georgiadis 2012), the 
other pieces of evidence are new to the literature.    
Moreover, we also report a strong positive relationship between training and the 
importance of unions on rents, which are very intuitively appealing. Other results also 
show that contractual arrangements, such as the presence of Collective agreements or Job 
Stability, are associated with lower levels of monitoring. On the other hand, job 
requirements, such as Soft skills, enhance the need for monitoring.  
Obviously the paper is not free of shortcomings that future research could overcome. 
For example, new methodological developments will let us to control for endogeneity 
problems in recursive models with an order dependent and independent variable. 
Although we do not have clear arguments suggesting that the empirical evidence comes 
from a very special context, only further evidence can show whether our results are 
replicated (or not) in other countries and periods of time. There is room for improvement 
in the measurement of different theoretical concepts. Information on innovations in the 
work place, the cost cuts that such innovation implies and detailed information on 
monitoring investments will help to improve the tests of the model and enrich the 
theoretical debate. 
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Figure 1. Model Timeline 
 
 
Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
Firm and workers:  
 
Observe the firm’s 
private benefits 
from introducing 
innovation B. 
 
Know the 
probability λ that 
an innovative task 
will be feasible 
when the worker 
will be allocated 
to the workplace 
 
 
 
 
The firm offers a 
contract. 
 
The worker 
accepts or rejects 
it. 
The worker: 
 
Observes whether 
an innovative task 
is feasible or not. 
 
Decides if he or 
she should 
innovate (d=1) or 
not (d=0). 
The firm: 
 
Invests in 
monitoring the 
task with intensity 
m. 
The worker exerts 
effort e 
 
Firm and workers 
observe worker’s 
performance, I= H 
or I= L. 
 
Payments based 
on worker’s 
performance are 
made 
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Table 1 
Distribution of the Plants by Size and Economic Sector 
Variable Category % 
Sample 
% 
Population 
Size From 50 to 99 employees 47.49 55.07 
 From 100 to 199 employees 33.52 24.39 
 From 200 to 499 employees 13.97 15.22 
 More than 500 employees  5.03 5.32 
 Total 100 100 
Industry Food, drink and tobacco 16.48 16.05 
 Textile industry, dressmaking, leather and footwear 8.66 6.39 
 Wood, cork, paper and graphic arts 10.06 10.96 
 Furniture and various manufacturing industries 4.19 5.36 
 Rubber, plastic materials and non-metallic mineral 
products 
19.83 16.21 
 Machinery and metal equipment  12.01 16.98 
 Chemical industry 3.07 5.54 
 Mechanical equipment and machinery  8.38 8.71 
 Electric equipment 3.07 3.86 
 Motor vehicle and transport supply  8.94 4.63 
 Electronic, medical, optical and computer equipment 2.79 2.78 
 Pharmaceutical industry 1.96 2.01 
 Aeronautical industry .56 .48 
 Total 100 100 
The population of Spanish establishments is taken from the Central Directorate of Companies. In the sample 
the variable size is continuous but in the population the information about the size appears in categories.  
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Table 2.   
Definition and mean of the variables. 
 
Original questions 
 
Variable 
 
Type 
 
Mean 
Measures the salaries of the blue-collar workers 
compared to the salaries of the blue-collar 
workers of the direct competitors (Likert scale) 
 
Rents 
 
Likert 
 
2.3436 
Measures to what extent workers are supervised 
when performing their job (Likert scale) 
Monitoring Likert 3.2961 
Measures the level of autonomy (when, how and 
in what order a task has to be implemented) that 
the blue-collar worker has on performing their 
job (Likert scale) 
Autonomy Dummy 0.6089 
1) A large number of products are made in your 
plant, 2) The products made in the plant are very 
different from each other, 3) The mixture of 
products made in the plant can easily be changed, 
4) Many new products are introduced each year, 
5) The new products are usually very different 
from the existing ones, 6) The products we 
produce undergo continuous modifications 
Job complexity Continuous:
Factorial 
analysis 
0 
The level of qualification required for the plant’s 
blue-collar workers to perform the job (Likert 
scale) 
Medium Skill 
requirements 
Dummy 0.6229 
 High Skill requirements Dummy 0.1788 
Evaluates investment in human capital in terms of 
both hours and money (Likert scale) 
Medium training Dummy 0.5587 
 High training Dummy 0.2933 
Plant’s selection criterion takes into consideration 
workers’ learning capabilities, interpersonal 
abilities, cultural adjustment, attitudes, and even 
the personalities (Likert scale) 
Soft skill requirements Dummy 0.7458 
Number of workers Size Continuous 205 
The firm has plants in addition to the one being 
interviewed, either in Spain or abroad (Binary 
answer) 
Multi-plant Dummy 0.5587 
Author’s sector classification Technological intensity Dummy 0.6034 
Assess unions’ degree of influence on blue-collar 
workers 
Unions influence Dummy 0.3268 
There is a specific collective agreement that 
regulates the labor conditions of blue-collar 
workers (Binary answer) 
Collective agreement Dummy 0.5865 
Solid commitment to maintaining employment 
relationship with blue collar-workers indefinitely 
(Likert scale) 
Job stability Dummy 0.5168 
Evaluate degree of market competition faced by 
the plants (Likert scale) 
Market Competition Dummy 0.3520 
Evaluate variability magnitude in demand from 
year to year (Likert scale) 
Medium Uncertainty Dummy 0.5726 
 High Uncertainty Dummy 0.2821 
Note: Number of observations: 358. The standard deviation in the case of size is 531. 
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Table 3.   
Distribution of rents and monitoring conditional to autonomy. 
 
1 
Total 
disagreement 
2 
Disagreement 
 
3  
Neither agreement 
nor disagreement 
4  
Agreement 
 
5  
Total 
Agreement 
Rents  9  
2.51% 
224  
62.57% 
118  
32.96% 
7  
1.50% 
0 
0% 
Rents conditional to Autonomy =1 4 
1.83% 
154  
70.64% 
54  
24.77% 
6  
2.75% 
0 
0% 
Rents conditional to Autonomy =0 5  
3.57% 
70  
50.00% 
64  
45.71% 
1  
0.71% 
0 
0% 
Monitoring 10  
2.79% 
63  
17.60% 
116  
 32.40% 
149   
41.62% 
20   
5.59% 
Monitoring  conditional to Autonomy =1 2 
9.17% 
23 
10.6% 
65 
29.8% 
119 
54.6% 
9 
4.1% 
Monitoring  conditional to Autonomy =0 8 
5.7% 
40 
28.6% 
51 
36.4% 
30 
21.4% 
11 
7.9% 
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Table 4 
                                 Model 1. Independent Ordered Probits 
 
 
Model 2. Semi-Ordered Probit 
 
Dependent 
variables 
Monitoring 
Eq (6) 
Rents 
Eq (7) 
Monitoring 
Eq (6) 
Rents 
Eq (7) 
Independent 
Variables 
Estimates p-
values 
Estimates p-
values 
Estimates p-
values 
Estimates p-
values 
Monitoring   -.29** .04   -1.27** .02 
Autonomy .44*** .00 -.22 .20 .55*** .00 .004 .98 
Job complexity .04 .55 -.11* .09 .04 .57 -.09 .17 
Medium Skill 
requirements 
.20 .26 .01 .96 .21 .30 .08 .64 
High Skill 
requirements 
.07 .76 -.09 .73 -.14 .57 -.10 .65 
Medium 
training 
-.26 .14 .40* .07 -.22 .31 .28 .19 
High training -.28 .19 .97*** .00 -.16 .52 .79*** .00 
Soft skill 
requirements 
.35** .02 -.03 .83 .41** .2 .12 .51 
Size -.00003 .64 -.0001 .52 -.0003 .14 -.0001 .31 
Multi-plant .01 .91 .25* .07 .04 .76 .24* .08 
Technological 
intensity 
-.25** .04 .05 .71 -.03 .84 -.03 .83 
Unions 
influence 
.03 .82 .38*** .00 -.10 .52 .31** .04 
Collective 
agreement 
-.27** .03 .25* .09 -.29* .05 .11 .52 
Job stability -.25** .04 .09 .52 -.26* .08 -.01 .93 
Market 
Competition 
.01 .92 -.02 .91 .03 .83 -.01 .95 
Medium 
Uncertainty 
-.21 .21 .14 .48 -21 .31 .06 .76 
High 
Uncertainty 
-.01 .96 .12 .62 .03 .88 .12 .56 
Cut1 -2.23  -1.38    -1.63  
Cut2 -1.01  1.19    .63  
Cut3 -.02  3.07    2.28  
Cut4 1.57      .17  
Chi2 50.84*** .00 60.33*** .00   73.27*** .00 
Pseudo R2 .06  .09      
Log likelihood 
rho (ρ) 
-438.72  -270.40    -491.11 
.62 
 
.38 
N 358  358    358  
*Statistically significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level 
The models have been estimated using robust standard errors 
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Appendix 1. The model solution demonstration (Proposition 1). 
 
Proposition 1b) 
The minimization of the objective function implies minimizing the cost function 
TC(d) subject to Restrictions 1 to 4. Hw *(d) - Lw *(d) = )ˆ(*'/)ˆ(' ePeC  guarantees that 
the Incentive compatibility constraint (1) is fulfilled at the lower expected wages. The 
Lw  that guarantees the Interim participation constraint (3) and the Limited liability 
constraint (4) at the minimum expected wage is the maximum of  ( ) ( ) θ/'ˆ êCeêC −  and 
–F. Take note that ( ) ( ) NRêCeêC θ/'ˆ− = –F. Lw (d) = ( ) ( ) θ/'ˆ êCeêC −  implies that the 
expected wage is equal to the effort cost and    θ >    NRθ . Values of    θ greater than 
   NRθ increase the monitoring costs without reducing the expected wages. The 
optimal values of    θ are then restricted to the cases where    θ ≤    NRθ . In these cases 
Lw *(d) = -F guarantees the Interim participation constraint (3) and the Limited 
liability constraint (4). Note that whenever the Interim participation constraint (3) is 
fulfilled, it will also be the Participation constraint (2). 
Proposition 1b) Q.E.D. 
 
We follow Theorem 5 in Demougin and Fluet (2001) for Proposition 1 a) 
 
Given the results above, the cost function TC(d) minimization problem can be 
rewritten as: 
 
)(dm
Min ))1()(())(()( ddMdwEdTC −−+= γθ = ))1()(()(/)ˆ(ˆ ddMdeCe −−+ γθθ , 
s.t.   (d) θ = m+γ(1- d)  ≤    NRθ  
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)}1()(()(
)ˆ('ˆ
min{arg)( ddM
d
eCedR −−+∈ γθθ
θ will be an interior solution to this 
problem when    )( NRR d θθ ≤ .  
When    )( NRR d θθ >
,
 and given that TC(d) is continuously decreasing with respect 
to 
   )(dθ  while   )()( dd Rθθ < , the optimal solution will be    )(* NRd θθ = .  
Proposition 1 a) Q.E.D. 
 
We follow Theorems 1 and 6 in Demougin and Fluet (2001) for Proposition 1 c). 
 
Propositions 1a, 1b and m* (1) >m* (0) imply that if innovations are introduced, the 
firm will pay at least the same expected wages and will spend more on monitoring. We 
should then expect an increase in the firm’s total cost of inducing the optimal level of 
effort:  
 
0))0(())0(/())1(())1(/()0()1( >−+−+=−=∆ mMmmMmTCTC γαα
 
 
Where α ˆ ˆ'( )eC e≡ . 
 
Thus the net benefit of introducing an innovation, B-∆, may not always be positive. In 
the cases in which it is negative, it will be optimal to forbid innovations by not 
providing autonomy (a = 0). Otherwise, autonomy will be provided (a = 1), because it 
is expected a priori that innovations will take place with probability λ> 0. Next, we 
provide a demonstration of m* (1) >m* (0) which also guarantees that Restriction 5 is 
fulfilled. 
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Proposition 1c (reformulated): The monitoring level is higher when there are 
innovations: m* (1) >m* (0) > 0. 
 
Let us to define mR (d)  as mR (d)≡θR(d)-γ(1- d) 
The optimal monitoring intensity mR (d) >0 fulfils the first order condition (for 
m) of the minimization problem: 
 
)()1()( mMmddTCMinm ++−= γ
α
 
F.O.C.: 0))(('))()1(( 2 =++−− dmMdmd RRγ
α
 
 
Given the assumptions about the monitoring cost function, the second order 
conditions for a minimum are satisfied. The first order condition equation could 
have different solutions for the optimal m depending on d. Let us define  n = 
)0()1( =−= dmdm RR as the difference in the solution when an innovation has 
been introduced and when this is not the case. The first order condition implies 
that: 
 
22 ))1())(1(('))0())(0((' =====+= dmdmMdmdmM RRRR αγ .  
 
Consequently, ))1(('
))1(('
))1((
))1((
2
2
ndmM
dmM
dm
ndm
R
R
R
R
−=
=
=
=
−=+γ
 
 
Given that >()''κ 0, when n= γ,   
 
))1(('
))1(('
1))1((
))1((
2
2
ndmM
dmM
dm
ndm
R
R
R
R
−=
=
<=
=
−=+γ
 
 
whereas when n= 0, ))1(('
))1(('
1))1((
))1((
2
2
ndmM
dmM
dm
ndm
R
R
R
R
−=
=
=>
=
−=+γ
.  
 
Consequently, 0< n<γ. 
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Given that θR(d)≡γ(1- d) + mR (d) , the results above imply that θR(0) >θR(1). Thus we 
can find three possible situations:  
Situation 1: NRθ ≥θR(0) >θR(1). The worker obtains rents. The optimal level of 
monitoring conditional to the introduction of an innovation will be m*(d) = mR (d). 
The expected wage of the worker ( θα / -F) is higher when an innovation is introduced 
(d=1) than otherwise (d=0), therefore Restriction 5 is fulfilled with inequality. When 
it is possible to introduce an innovation, it is in the best interest of the worker to 
introduce it. 
Situation 2: θR(0) >θR(1) > NRθ  . The worker does not obtain rents. The optimal level 
of monitoring conditional to the introduction of an innovation will be m*(d) = θNR - 
γ(1- d). By definition θ
 NR>0 and by assumption θ NR >γ, so m*(1) - γ= m*(0) >0. 
Restriction 5 is fulfilled with equality. An innovation will be introduced whenever it 
is possible, although in this case the worker is indifferent about whether to introduce 
an innovation or not. 
Situation 3: θR(0) > NRθ ≥θR(1). The worker would not obtain rents when an innovation 
is not introduced (d=0) and would obtain rents when an innovation is introduced 
(d=1). The optimal level of monitoring conditional to the introduction of an 
innovation will be m*(0) = mR (0)= θR(0) -γ> NRθ  -γ and  m*(1) = θNR≥θR(1) = mR (1) 
. Thus γ>m*(1)-m*(0) ≥mR (1)- mR (0) >0.  Restriction 5 is fulfilled with inequality 
when there is no innovation, and fulfilled with equality when an innovation is 
produced. 
In all the situations Restriction 5 is fulfilled and γ≥m*(1)-m*(0) >0 and m*(0) >0. 
 Proposition 1 c) Q.E.D. 
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Appendix 2. A model extension 
 
Let us assume that at Stage 0 neither the firm nor the worker knows exactly how the 
monitoring cost function will be at Stage 3. At Stage 0 it is common knowledge that the 
monitoring costs function is M = kM(m), where k is a random variable with a maximum 
and minimum value, 0>≥≥ kkk , and a probability density function K(k). The task 
decision (Stage 2) is irrevocable, since it is highly costly to change once one has been 
adopted. The value of k is realized in Stage 3, before the monitoring level is implemented. 
The value k is observed by all the parties and is contractible.  
Proposition 1.A: An optimal contract to implement a level of effort eˆ is determined 
by the following conditions: 
a) The optimal information level for  performance is: 
    }),,({),(* NRR kdMinkd θθθ = , where 
)}1(),((),(
)ˆ('ˆ
min{arg),( dkdM
kd
eCekdR −−+∈ γθθ
θ  
   NRθ =
( ) '
( )
ê C ê
C ê F+
, 
where m*(d,k) ≡θ * (d,k) - γ(1- d) > 0 then γ ≥ m*(1,k) - m*(0,k) >0. 
 
b) The optimal wages contingent on the monitoring signal I = {H,L} are: 
Lw *(d,k) = -F 
Hw *(d,k) = )ˆ(*'/)ˆ(' ePeC  - F 
 
Where, )),(*/(),ˆ(* kdHPkeP θ= . 
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c) The optimal level of autonomy is: 
 
*
*
1                   if  0
0                   otherwise.
B
a

− ∆ ≥

= 


 
      Where ∆*=  ∫ −
k
k
dkkKkTCkTC )()),0(*),1(*(   
The model in the main text can be considered as being a particular case (K (k=1) = 1) for 
this general setting. The main difference is that the optimal level of monitoring (and 
consequently wages) will be conditional to the marginal monitoring costs function k, by 
following in each of the cases all the conditions described in Proposition 1a and 1b.  
By replacing these values in the function TC, we can define TC*(1,k) and TC*(0,k). 
Proposition 1c follows as stated, with the difference that: 
 ∆*=  ∫ −
k
k
dkkKkTCkTC )()),0(*),1(*(  
The decision on autonomy is now based on expectations about the level of monitoring. 
Those firms that provide autonomy will expect higher levels of monitoring (Hypothesis 
1). The optimal information level, ),(* kdθ , on accordance with Propositions 1A a and 
b will have the following properties: 
∂ ),(* kdθ / ∂  k < 0   for  k < kNR(d)  where ),(* kdθ =θ NR.  
),(* kdθ = θ NR  for k  ≥  kNR(d). 
Given a certain level of autonomy, when kkkNR ≥>  , the optimal information level will 
be θNR and the workers will not obtain rents. When NRkkk ≥≥ , the optimal information 
level (monitoring) will be lower and the workers will obtain rents (Hypothesis 2). 
